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years. Unemployment has then decreased to the average European level, being 8.5 percent in
October 2002. In this paper, we describe the shocks leading to this unforeseen increase in
unemployment. We then discuss the role of labour market institutions in the adjustment
process that has brought unemployment back to ‘normal’ levels. We argue that these
institutions cannot be blamed for the increase in unemployment, but that more flexible
institutions could have lead to a more rapid decline in unemployment.
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1.  Overview
Development in Finnish unemployment during the past twenty years is an exceptional episode
in the modern economic history. For most of the1980s, the unemployment rates were around
five percent, similar to the other Scandinavian countries, but much lower than in the
continental Europe. In just four years, beginning in 1991, the unemployment rate hiked to
close to twenty percent. Increases of this magnitude had not occurred in the OECD countries
after the Second World War. 
The recovery was almost equally remarkable. The average growth rate of the Finnish
economy during the period 1994 – 2001 was 3.3, the second highest in the EU countries after
Ireland. Despite the fast growth, the unemployment rate has remained high when compared to
the pre-recession level. The latest figures at the time of writing of this report show that the
unemployment rate was 8.5% in October 2002.
Finnish economy experienced several adverse economic shocks in the early 1990’s. These
shocks were partly unavoidable developments in the international economy, such as the
collapse of exports to the Soviet Union, the fall in the terms of trade, and the rise in the
interest rates in Europe after the German unification. Domestic economic policies also
contributed to the adverse development. Real interest rose to close to 15% and real asset
prices fell creating problems first to the highly indebted private sector firms, and, eventually,
to the banking sector. Due to adverse macroeconomic shocks job destruction was rapid during
the first years in the 1990’s. The inflow to unemployment rose by 60% compared to the pre-
recession level.
The recession in the 1990’s was also associated with a rapid re-structuring of the economy.
The recovery in the sectors with largest declines in employment during the recession was
slow compared with the rapid growth in some new service sectors. This created a mismatch
problem in the labour market. The labour market institutions cannot be blamed for the decline
in employment in the early 1990’s, but some institutional features, particularly the
unemployment benefit system, clearly slowed the adjustment by lessening the incentives of
regional and occupational mobility. This is also reflected in the large increase in the duration
of unemployment during the 1990’s. 3
It is perhaps most informative to start with a picture that puts the Finnish unemployment in
perspective by comparing the Finnish unemployment rates to the EU average. It is also natural
to compare the Finnish experience to the Swedish one, as the two neighbouring countries have
rather similar labour market institutions and faced partly similar shocks.
Figure 1.1 presents the seasonally adjusted standardized unemployment rates in Finland,
Sweden and EU-15 since 1980. The figure shows that the Finnish (and Swedish)
unemployment rates were much below European average for most of the 1980s. The low
unemployment rate in Scandinavian countries was often cited as evidence on the success of
the Scandinavian model with corporatist wage-setting. For example, Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991) argue that coordinated bargaining moderates wage growth and decreases
unemployment by internalising the employment effects of wage bargains.  
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Figure 1.1. Standardized unemployment rates in Finland, Sweden and EU-15
Source:  OECD Main Economic Indicators. Before 1988 EU-12 from OECD Employment Outlook.
As seen in Figure 1.1. the Scandinavian model appears to have worked less well during the
1990s. Unemployment rates increased rapidly in both Finland and Sweden and followed very
similar time pattern in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Finland the unemployment rates4
started to increase in 1991, reached the peak of 18% in 1994, and began a rapid decline that
has lasted until 2001. 
In this article we try to provide a detailed description of the events, and come up with some
explanations for the exceptional development. The rest of the article is organized as follows.
We start in section 2 by describing the macroeconomic development leading to the crisis in
the early 1990s. This is followed in section 3 by an analysis of the structural changes during,
and perhaps because of, the recession. The latter part of the paper is more micro-oriented,
looking first, in section 4, at the effects of various labour market institutions on the level of
unemployment. In section 5 we examine the changes in the duration of unemployment.
Finally, section 6 summarizes our findings.
2. Economic crisis in the early 1990s
The record high increase in unemployment in the early 1990’s was caused by large
macroeconomic shocks, both international and domestic. The roots of the 1990’s crisis can be
traced to the overheating period in the late 1980’s so we first characterize the changes that
occurred in the late 1980’s.
2.1. The 1980’s boom
1
In the first half of the 1980’s the performance of the Finnish economy, measured in terms of
economic growth, was relatively smooth, with an average growth rate slightly above the
OECD-European rate. This smooth development changed around 1986-87. Growth
accelerated significantly and the economy entered a period of overheating (see Figure 2.1). In
the process the rate of inflation rose from about 2-3 percent in 1986 to about 7 percent in
1989-90, and the rate of unemployment declined from the approximately 4 percent of the first
half of the decade to about 2.5-3 percent at the end of 1989. Several factors were behind this
change. Without trying to quantify their relative significance these can be classified into the
                                                
1 See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) for a detailed description of the overheating and the onset of the crisis.
The Special Issue of Finnish Economic Papers (1996) and the recent compilation of research papers in Kalela et
al (2001) contains a number of studies on different aspects of the Finland’s depression. 5
following categories: (i) Financial market deregulation, including both the abolition of
regulation of domestic bank lending rates and the lifting of restrictions on private borrowing
from abroad, led to an explosion of bank credit and large capital inflows. (ii) A sharp increase
in the terms of trade as a result of the fall in energy prices and the rise in world market prices
of forest products. (iii) Economic policies were not sufficiently restrictive in countering the
boom. Fiscal policy did not appear to counteract the fast growth. On the contrary, public
consumption and investment contributed positively to it.
The process of financial deregulation in the second half of the 1980s, was problematic in
several respects. First, its timing coincided with the upswing of the business cycle. Second,
rules and practices in prudential regulation and bank supervision were left unchanged. Third,
the tax system, which had favored debt financing of investments, was not reformed. Finally,
monetary policy tried to maintain some tightness in the wake of the boom, which increased
the interest rate. In the late 1980s, interest rates were on average 6 per cent higher in Finland
than e.g. in Germany. This, and investors’ belief in Markka’s fixed exchange rate,  provided
further impetus to the inflow of foreign capital in terms of foreign-currency denominated
borrowing by firms mainly in the non-traded sector. 
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Figure 2.1: GDP in Finland, Sweden and EU-countries6
2.2. Big Negative Shocks
The end of the boom came in 1990, when a rapid process towards bust started. Economic
activity, as measured by the growth rate of the real GDP, declined extremely rapidly from a
positive growth of 5.4 % in 1989 to a negative growth of 6.5  % in 1991. Thereafter, the
decline continued, though at a slower pace through 1992 and most of 1993. The decline in the
GDP stopped and a turnaround took place in the fall of 1993. While all domestic components
of the aggregate demand contributed to the decline in economic activity, a particularly
important feature was the major decline in investment activity. Also price inflation slowed
down significantly. The emergence of a major banking crisis was a notable feature of the bust
process. Rapidly falling asset prices (see Figure 2.2.) and bankruptcies of firms led to credit
losses and the government had to provide public support for banks. The banking crisis was an
episode of major financial restraint. Financial factors strongly accentuated both the rise and
the fall in the aggregate demand.
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Figure 2.2. Real asset prices
Both international and domestic factors contributed to the onset of the crisis. These factors
can be classified into “bad luck and bad policies”. First, the Finnish exports to the market
economies declined as a result of slow international growth, loss in the price competitiveness
of the Finnish industry, and the fall in the terms of trade. With the collapse of the Soviet7
Union, the Finnish exports and imports to Russia dropped in 1991 by 70 percent almost
overnight. Second, the German unification raised the interest rates in Europe as a result of
loose fiscal and tight monetary policies in Germany. Higher interest rate caused a big negative
shock to the highly indebted private sector. Third, monetary policy turned very restrictive in
early 1989 after the revaluation of the Finnish markka. The defense of the markka against
speculative attacks increased nominal interest rates, and when the inflation rate decreased at
the beginning of the recession, the real interest rate increased dramatically. (See Figure 2.3.)
The fixed exchange rate was eventually abandoned with the devaluation of the Finnish
markka in November 1991 and its floating in September 1992. Depreciation of the currency
improved the price competitiveness of the export sector but the companies that had large
debts in foreign currency suffered large losses. 
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Figure 2.3 Real interest rates
2.3. Resumed Growth 
The Finnish economy turned around in late 1993. Initially this recovery was mostly
concentrated in the export industries that benefited from the depreciation of the Finnish
markka. Notwithstanding rapid growth during the period 1994-2001 – 3.3 %  and the second
highest in the EU countries after Ireland - inflation has remained low and external
competitiveness has increased rapidly (see Figure 2.4). 8
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Figure 2.4.  Relative unit labor costs in 14 competitor countries / Finland 
Source: Bank of Finland 
The low inflation and strong external competitiveness have been the result of two things:
First, the European new architecture of inflation targeting has changed the relationship
between economic growth and inflation.  Second, the centralized wage bargaining, prevailing
in most years, has moderated wage formation and, thereby, contributed to higher
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. We analyze this question in section 4.4.
Moreover, in Spring 1995 a new government was formed and from the start it formulated a
program of fiscal consolidation that covered its term in office. The program was well received
in the markets and the interest rate differential to Germany dropped dramatically. 9
All in all, improved monetary credibility in the form of inflation targeting, the dominance of
centralized bargaining and the systematic program of fiscal consolidation clearly played a role
in the turnaround and resumption of economic growth in Finland in the mid-1990’s.
3. Structural changes after recession
In this section we describe structural changes that occurred in Finland in the 1990s. First, we
look at the shifts in employment across industries during the recession and recovery and
present the development of the Beveridge-curve during the last three decades in section 3.1.
Second, we describe the changes in the structure of unemployment in terms of age, education
and region in section 3.2. 
During just four years of the economic crisis, 450 000 jobs were destroyed. Total employment
declined by 18 percent from its 1990 level. In the first quarter of 1994, employment was
slightly below 2 million, at its lowest level since 1949. After 1994, employment has grown
steadily, by approximately 2 percentage points each year. By 2001, total employment has
grown by 313 000, or by about two thirds of the decline in the early 1990s.
In figure 3.1, we show the flows into and out of unemployment based on data from
unemployment offices. The figure shows how the increase in the inflow to unemployment
occurred over a relatively short time period. The number of new unemployment spells was
exceptionally high for only three years 1991, -92 and -93. During these three years more than
50 000 new job seekers entered the unemployment offices each month. By 1994, the inflow
was back to the pre-recession level. Similar rapid movements cannot be seen in the outflow of
unemployment. In fact the outflow has increased rather smoothly during the whole period.
2     
                                                
2 As the pool of unemployment increased, outflow rate, calculated as a fraction of the unemployed ending the
spell during the month, naturally dropped dramatically.10
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Figure 3.1 : Flows into and out of unemployment
Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
3.1 Sectoral shifts in employment and mismatch
During the recession some sectors suffered much more than others. Construction industry was
hit particularly hard; half of the jobs in construction disappeared between 1990 and 1994.
Employment declined by approximately 25 % also in manufacturing, retail trade, hotels and
restaurants, and financial services. Figure 3.2 shows the contribution of different sectors to the
total decline in employment. 
Total employment increased rapidly during the recovery after 1994. The largest increases in
employment occurred in the business services and in the manufacturing of equipment. The
electronics industry was responsible for most of the growth in manufacturing; other
manufacturing sectors experienced only modest employment increases. The service sector,
particularly business services, education and social services, grew rapidly. After 1994,
employment declined substantially only in agriculture and financial intermediation. Decline in
the agriculture continues a long trend that had begun already in the 1960s. Decline in the
financial intermediation is mostly due to the restructuring of the banking sector after the
financial crisis.  
As Figure 3.2. indicates, the newly created jobs were rather different from the jobs lost in the
early 1990s. The most rapidly growing service sectors had only experienced small
employment declines during the recession. Of the sectors that experienced large job losses11
during the recession, employment returned close to the pre-recession level only in the
manufacturing of equipment. Less than a half of the employment decline in construction and
only a third of the employment decline in retail trade was matched by subsequent employment
growth after 1994.  
The rapid structural change in employment created a mismatch problem in the labour market.
Unemployed ex-construction workers were poorly equipped to find jobs in the growing
service sector. Skill-requirements were often higher than the education level of the
unemployed. Uneven regional development also contributed to the mismatch problem.
The clearest indication of growing mismatch is the Beveridge-curve that shows the
relationship between the unemployment rate and open vacancies in the employment offices
3.
Figure 3.3 describes the Beveridge-curve for the period 1971-2001. It shows how most of the
                                                
3Vacancy data refers to the average number of vacancies in employment offices during the month. As not all
vacancies are reported to the employment offices, this is clearly an underestimate of the true vacancy rate. Time
consistency of the vacancy series is also a problem. Since 1988, employers have been required to report open
vacancies to the employment offices which increased the number of vacancies by almost 40%.  Uusitalo (1999)
experimented with different adjustments to the vacancy series using the time series of the number of help-wanted
ads in the largest Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, as a reference. The adjustment did raise the pre-1988
UV-curve upward, but did not change the visual impression, and most importantly, it did not affect conclusions
about the large shift in the curve during the 1990s.    13
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Figure 3.2: Change in employment by industry during the recession and recovery
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Labour Force Survey. Industry classification
according to ISIC 2-3 digit classification as used in the LFS.
variation in the unemployment rate is related to business cycle (movements along the curve in
north-west and south-east direction). However, the curve has also clearly moved out. Eyeball
econometrics reveals two clear outward shifts in the curve. The first occurred in late 1970s
and the other much larger shift in the early 1990s. By the year 2000 the vacancy rate is back
to its level in 1988, but the unemployment rate is about six percent higher. 14
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3.2 The structure of unemployment
A complementary indication of growing mismatch to the Beveridge curve in the labour
market is the increase in the variation in unemployment rates across age groups, education
levels and different regions. According to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), the NAIRU-
unemployment rate is directly related to the coefficient of variation in the unemployment
rates. Although the result depends on the number of assumptions on the wage- and price-
setting, it is useful to examine the evolution of the unemployment rates at a more
disaggregated level.
Figure 3.4 describes the unemployment rates by ten-year age categories. At the end of the
1980s, the unemployment rates were very low in all but the youngest age group and there was
very little dispersion in the older age groups, unemployment rates ranged between two and
three percent. For the youngest group the unemployment rate was almost nine percent. At the
onset of the recession the unemployment rates increased in all age groups. Interestingly, the
dispersion of unemployment rates, measured by the coefficient of variation, across age groups15
actually decreased. Youth unemployment increased to a very high level: This appears to
reflect a general decrease in the labour demand that had the largest effect on the group that
was in the weakest position in the labour market. The decrease in the unemployment rates was
rather uniform in all age groups. The unemployment rates of older groups decreased to 7 – 9
percent, youth unemployment to 20 percent.
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Figure 3.4: Unemployment rates by age 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 
The evolution of the unemployment rates by the level of education shows no large surprises.
The unemployment rate among the group with the lowest education is much higher than
unemployment of the group with higher education. The unemployment rate for those with
university education never rose above five percent. Measured by the coefficient of variation,
the dispersion of the unemployment rates has been slowly increasing after 1994. In relative
terms, the decline in unemployment has been slightly slower for the lowest educated group.  16
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment rates by the level of education. 
Source: Labour Force Surveys. Note: Unemployment rates up to 1999 are re-calculated according to
the new classification by Statistics Finland. 
Finally, we look at the development of regional unemployment. Unemployment rose rapidly
in all regions during the early 1990s, but the relative variation measured by the coefficient of
variation was smaller in 1994 than in 1990. During the economic recovery regional variation
in the unemployment rates has increased.  Employment growth has been rapid in the capital
region and Southern Finland, and much slower in the high unemployment regions in Northern
and Eastern Finland. 
Regional unemployment rates presented in Figure 3.6 come from 15 regional Employment
and Economic Development Centres (TE-Center). Showing 15 lines in a graph creates a
messy figure. Therefore, we demonstrate the changes in dispersion by drawing hopefully
more informative “box-whiskers” –plots. In the graph, the box shows the inter-quartile range
in regional unemployment rates, and the line in the middle the median. The whiskers extend
to the lowest and highest values that lie within 1.5 quartile range from the lower and upper
quartiles. The remaining outliers are indicated with plots. Figure 3.6 indicates clearly that
regional differences in unemployment have increased during the recovery period.     17
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Figure 3.6: Regional dispersion of unemployment rates
Source: Unemployment by TE-center according to Labour Force Surveys as reported in the Finnish
Labour Review 2/2002.
4. Labour Market Institutions
4.1. Labour market institutions and unemployment
It has often been suggested that the low unemployment rate in the US is due to dynamic and
flexible job markets, while the high European unemployment results from rigid and inflexible
markets. An important issue is then to ask: which features of labour markets do generate
unemployment and which do not matter? 
Nickell (1997) classifies labour market institutions into the following categories: (i)
employment protection and labour standards, (ii) benefit replacement ratio and benefit
duration, (iii) active labour market policies, (iv) union density and coverage of bargaining
agreements, (v) co-ordination of wage bargaining, and (vi) the tax wedge. In what follows in
sections 4.2.-4.6 we describe the main features of these institutions in Finland, survey the
empirical evidence on their effects on unemployment and present some new analyses.18
Recent research has provided some evidence in favour of the view that accounting for the
interaction between economic shocks and labour market institutions can go a long way to
explain both the higher average European unemployment compared to that in the US, and the
cross-country differences within Europe. (Ball (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)).
Below we provide evidence on the interaction of shocks and institutions in Finland by
examining the effects of unemployment insurance in the different stages of the business cycle.
4.2 Job Protection
Compared to the other European countries the employment protection in Finland does not
stand out as particularly strict. The OECD Employment Outlook (1999) ranks 26 OECD
countries according to the strictness of the employment protection legislation. Finland is on
the 12
th place, counting from the more flexible end. Employment protection is clearly stricter
than in the US, the UK and the other Anglo-Saxon countries, but more flexible than in the
other Scandinavian countries (excluding Denmark), and than in the most countries in Central
and Southern Europe. 
In Finland the employer may terminate a permanent contract if “the work to be offered has
diminished substantially and permanently for financial or production-related reasons”.
(Employment Contacts Act (55/2001)).  The employees must be consulted in collective
dismissals. Advance notice is required; the shortest notice period is two weeks for the
contracts that have lasted for less than a year. The notice period increases with tenure, up to
six months for the contacts that have lasted for more than 12 years. The employers can also
temporarily lay-off workers with 14 days notice, but many union contracts include rules that
increase minimum notice periods stated in law.  
There are no particularly strict rules governing temporary contracts. Temporary contracts are
possible for specific reasons, for example, to replace a permanent employee during temporary
absence or if the nature of work is temporary. Contracts can be renewed, but several
consequent temporary contracts entitle the worker to the same rights as permanent contracts. 
Temporary contracts have become more popular after recession. Up to the early 1990s
approximately 10 percent of the workers were employed on temporary contracts. Temporary
contracts became more common after 1994, so that 16 percent of employees were on a
temporary contract in 1997. The share fell slightly over the period 1997-2000.  (see,19
Kauhanen 2001). It appears that during a recession the firms are more likely to offer
temporary contracts and the workers more likely to accept these. 
Temporary contracts clearly increase the flow into unemployment. In 1997, 63 percent of the
new unemployment spells were ‘caused’ by ending of a temporary contract. However,
temporary contracts probably also increase flows out of unemployment so that their effects on
the level of unemployment are unclear. 
4.3 Unemployment benefits and unemployment
The unemployment benefit system may have large impacts both on the level and the duration
of unemployment. Below, we first describe the level and the duration of benefits as well as
the eligibility rules of the current system. We then go through the main changes to the system
during the past twenty years, survey the existing Finnish evidence on the effects of
unemployment benefit scheme and provide some new findings. 
4.3.1 The current benefit system
Unemployment benefits system in Finland consists of labour market subsidies and
unemployment allowances. Unemployment allowance can be further classified to the basic
allowance paid by the state through the Social Insurance Institution (UA) and the earnings
related allowance paid by the unemployment insurance funds (UI). 
In order to qualify for an unemployment allowance the unemployed must have been employed
for 43 weeks during the past two years. Earnings-related allowance also requires that
unemployed has been a member of an unemployment insurance fund for 10 months prior to
unemployment.
Unemployment allowance can be received for 500 days. An exception is made for the
unemployed who turn 57 before the benefits expire. These unemployed are entitled for an
extension of benefits until the age of 60. The age limit for the benefit extension was 55 up to
1997 and will be raised to 59 in 2005.    
Those unemployed who do not meet the employment condition, or who have already received
unemployment allowance for 500 days, can receive a labour market subsidy from the state.
The labour market subsidy is paid, subject to the means test, for an unlimited period. Both the
labour market subsidy and the basic allowance are currently 22,75 euro per day. Dependent20
children increase the benefits. The earnings-related unemployment allowance consists of a
basic amount equal to the basic allowance, and of an earnings-related part. The earnings-
related part is 45% of the difference between previous daily earnings and the basic allowance.
There is no ceiling on the unemployment benefits, but earnings exceeding 2045 euro per
month increase the allowance by only 20% of the exceeding amount. In practice, this implies
that for the median earner (2142 e/month) the gross replacement rate is 55%. Since benefits
increase by only a fraction of the previous earnings, replacement rate decreases with earnings.
For someone earning twice the median income, the gross replacement rate is 38%.   
Unemployment benefits are taxable income just as wages and salaries. Due to the progressive
taxation net replacement rates are higher than gross replacement rates. Accounting for the
effect of the income taxes increases the replacement rate for the median earner from 55% to
64%. Other earnings-related benefits such as housing allowance further increase net
replacement rates. 
4.3.2 Main changes to the unemployment benefit system during last two decades 
The current unemployment system is based on the Unemployment Security Act from 1984.
The main features of the system have remained similar for almost twenty years. Below we
describe the most important changes during the past two decades.
Benefit level
The unemployment allowance has increased by 9 % in real terms between 1984 and 2001.
During the same period the real wage and salary index increased by 38%, so that the growth
of benefits has clearly been much slower than the wage growth. As also the earnings-related
unemployment benefits are linked to the basic allowance, the replacement rates have
decreased considerably after the introduction of the Unemployment Security Act. The
earnings-related benefits were further reduced in 1992 when the rate by which previous wages
increase benefits was cut from 45% to 42%
4, and in 1993 when employee pension
contributions were first deducted from the base wage before calculating benefits.
                                                
4 The rate was raised back to 45% as a part of the national union bargaining agreement in 2001.21
According to the original Unemployment Security Act, the earnings-related unemployment
benefits were reduced by 20% after 100 days of unemployment. In 1987, the rule was
changed so that the benefits would be reduced by 12.5% after 200 days. In 1989, the
paragraph was abolished, and since then the earnings related benefits have been paid without
a reduction up to 500 days.
Benefit duration
The most important changes in the benefit duration concern the older workers and are linked
to the rules governing the unemployment pensions. The unemployment pensions were first
introduced in 1971. Originally, the pension was granted to the long-term unemployed who
were over 60. The age limit was lowered to 58 in 1978 and further to 55 in 1980. After 1986,
the age limit has been gradually increased back to 60. To secure the incomes of the long-term
unemployed, the maximum duration of benefits for the unemployed over 55 was
simultaneously increased so that the benefits last until the age when the unemployed become
eligible for unemployment pension (Lundqvist 1996).
The extension of the benefit duration up to the age when the unemployed become eligible for
the unemployment pension created a system where workers who become unemployed at the
age of 53 can receive unemployment or pension benefits until the normal retirement age, 65.
The system became popular during the recession, and is commonly known as “the
unemployment pension tunnel”. An important change in the legislation occurred in 1997
when the lower age limit for the benefit extension was raised from 55 to 57 years. 
Eligibility rules
Eligibility rules for the earnings-related unemployment benefits have always required that an
unemployed has been a member of an UI-fund, and that he has been employed prior to
unemployment. The same employment condition was also introduced to the basic
unemployment allowance in 1994. At the same time a new means tested benefit, the labour
market support, was created for those who do not meet the employment condition. As a result
the number of recipients of basic allowance rapidly decreased. Currently, most unemployed22
receive either the earnings related allowance or the labour market support. Eligibility rules
have become stricter over time.
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Figure 4.1: Recipients of unemployment benefits
Source data: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the number of recipients of different unemployment
benefits during the past twenty years. The changes in the eligibility criteria appear to do a
good job in explaining the numbers. Roughly half of the unemployed receive the earnings-
related unemployment benefits. The decrease in the number of recipients of the
unemployment assistance, and the corresponding increase in the number of recipients of the
labour market support, reflects the change in employment condition in 1994. The number of
‘unemployed’ on the unemployment pension increased during the 1980s when the age limit
was lowered and decreased beginning in the end of 1980s after the gradual increases in the
age limits. Note also that the number of recipients of the earnings-related benefits has
                                                
5 Prior to 1997, the unemployed were eligible for the unemployment allowance if they had been employed for six
months during past two years. In 1997, the requirement was raised to 43 weeks.   23
decreased after 1994 much more rapidly than the number of recipients of the unemployment
allowance or the labour market support.       
4.3.3. Evidence on the employment effects of unemployment benefits
The effect of the unemployment benefits on re-employment has been subject to a number of
studies during the past ten years. Below we survey a selective sample of the Finnish studies.
Kettunen (1993) uses data from the Ministry of Labour by drawing a random sample of 2077
unemployed from the flow into unemployment during 1985 and matching the data with
information on the actual unemployment benefits. The results indicate that a higher
replacement ratio lowers the exit hazard and that the effect is larger for non-members of the
UI-funds. He also finds that there is a peak in the baseline hazard rates after 20 weeks of
unemployment when unemployment benefits were reduced by 20%.  Another early study
worth mentioning is by Lilja (1993). She estimates competing risk models of exit from
unemployment based on data from Finnish Labour Force Surveys 1984 - 1987. She does not
calculate the replacement rates, but estimates the model separately for the recipients of
unemployment insurance (UI) and basic unemployment allowance (UA). The hazard rate for
the UI-recipients is twice as high as for the otherwise similar UA-recipients. As the UI-
recipients have generally much higher replacement rates this suggests that other factors vary
considerably across the two groups. 
Holm, Kyyrä and Rantala (1999) and Kyyrä (1999) attempt to improve the estimates by using
forward-looking measures of replacement rates. As unemployment periods are often
associated with significant wage decreases, the replacement rates based on the previous
earnings may overstate the gains from re-employment. They estimate expected post-
unemployment wages based on data on those who exit from employment and show that the
expected gain of employment increases considerably the likelihood of employment.  
A common problem in the existing Finnish studies is the lack of convincingly exogenous
variation in the replacement rates. The variation in the replacement rates is driven by the
variation in previous earnings, and is hence correlated with a number of factors that may
influence the re-employment probabilities. A clear illustration of the problem is that both Lilja
(1993) and Kettunen (1993) find that employment hazards are higher for the UI-benefit
recipients who have higher replacement rates.  24
Evidence on the effect of the duration of unemployment benefits is somewhat more
convincing. Rantala (2002) studies the effect of the change in the lower age limit of the
unemployment pension tunnel in 1997. The change effectively reduced the maximum benefit
duration to 500 days for workers who were between 53 and 54 years old. Prior to the reform
they could keep receiving unemployment benefits up to the retirement age. Figure 4.2 shows
the “transition rates” to unemployment by age between 1995 and 1999. In the figure the
unemployment entry rate is defined as the fraction of the workers employed at the end of year
t-1 who are unemployed at the end of year t. This measure clearly misses short unemployment
periods and is, therefore, also influenced by the duration of unemployment spells.
Nevertheless, the figure clearly shows that the unemployment risk increases considerably at
the beginning of the unemployment tunnel. Before the reform, the unemployment risk
doubled from 3 to 6 percent when the workers turned 53. After the reform the unemployment
risk for the 53-54 -year-olds was similar than for the younger workers. In 1997 – 1998, the
unemployment risk increases only after the workers turn 55, and meet the new age criteria.  
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Figure 4.2: Transitions to unemployment by age
Source: Rantala (2000)
There are important interactions between unemployment benefits and economic shocks.
Hakola and Uusitalo (2001) show that the incentives created by the generous unemployment
benefits for the older unemployed had little effect on the unemployment rates before the
recession. As seen in Figure 4.3, the unemployment rates for the 55 – 59 -year-olds were close25
to the unemployment rates of the younger groups up to the early 1990s. The generosity of
benefits suddenly started to matter during the recession. The unemployment rates of 55 – 59 –
year-olds increased to over 20 percent, twice as high as for the younger age groups. Similar
interaction effects between shocks and institutions can be found also in micro cross-section
data. Using a linked worker-firm panel, Hakola and Uusitalo (2001) show that the effect of
the unemployment tunnel eligibility is much larger when the firm faces a negative demand
shock. 
Extended unemployment benefits for the older workers are responsible for a large share of
aggregate unemployment. In 2000, one third of all registered unemployed (including those on
unemployment pension) were over 55. The effect on long-term unemployment is even larger;
in 2000, two thirds of long-term unemployed were over 55.
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Figure 4.3: Unemployment rates by age
Source: Hakola & Uusitalo (2001)
A number of studies on the effect of the benefit duration focus on the hazard of employment
around the benefit exhaustion date. For example, Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990)
note that, in the US, the probability of leaving unemployment rises just prior to when the
benefits elapse. Carling et. al. (1996) find a similar but smaller effect using Swedish data.
They also note that the exit rates to various training programs rise dramatically around the
time of the benefit exhaustion. 26
To examine the question we constructed a data of all unemployment spells experienced by
350 000 individuals drawn from the Employment Statistics of Statistics Finland, which
contains information from various registers and covers the entire Finnish population.
6  Of the
104 358 new unemployment spells, 57 percent ended in re-employment. Some 30 percent of
the unemployed entered training programs or subsidized jobs, and 9 percent moved out of the
labour force. 
Below we draw empirical hazard rates separately by the exit route, treating other exits as
censored observations. The top left corner of figure 4.4 that includes exits to all destinations,
shows two clear spikes in the hazard rate. The first is at 360 days and the second right after
the maximum duration of the benefits at 500 days. However, when we look only at the exits to
the open employment, these spikes disappear altogether! The hazard to the open employment
shows negative duration dependence, but no effects of the benefit exhaustion. There is no
clear pattern in the exits from the labour force. Partly this is due to that fact that most exits to
out of labour force occur at the older age that is outside our sample. Finally, the lower right
corner provides an explanation for the spikes in the hazard. Most labour market programs are
targeted for the long-term unemployed who have been unemployed for over a year. This
shows as a big increase in the hazard at 360 days. Hazard of entering the labour market
programs also grows around the benefit expiration date. 
                                                
6 The information on unemployment spells is based on administrative data on the dates when the unemployed
were registered at the employment offices. In order to focus on the unemployed who risk losing their benefits
after 500 days, we restrict the sample to the unemployed who are under 53 at the start of the unemployment spell
and who receive earnings-related unemployment benefits. Information on the benefits is based on tax records
and was available for 1995 – 1998. We excluded some 10% of the spells because the reason of ending the spell
was unknown. The spells that did not end by the end of 1999 were treated as censored.27
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Figure 4.4: Hazard of exit from unemployment
   
4.4 Unions and wage formation
4.4.1 Union density
As in other Scandinavian countries, the union density is high in Finland. The union density
has increased rather steadily from the 1960’s to the early 1990’s. Pehkonen and Tanninen
(1997) report that the union density was 22 % in 1960, and has since then increased, reaching
82% in 1992. According to the Working Life Barometer, the union density peaked at 86 % in
1995 and has slightly declined during the latter half of the 1990’s being 83 % in October
2001. 
4.4.2 Unions and unemployment insurance
One of the main reasons for increased union density is the increase in unemployment. Under a
“Gent-system” the unemployment insurance is organized around UI-funds administered by
the unions and subsidized by the government. Membership is voluntary and the increase in the28
unemployment risk encourages workers to seek membership in the UI-funds. In most cases
this is easiest to do by joining a union.
7
The funding of the unemployment benefits is designed to moderate the wage-pressures. After
a reform in 1999, the state pays the labour market subsidies and the basic unemployment
allowances. State also subsidises UI-funds by paying a share of the earnings-related
unemployment allowance. The state subsidy corresponds to the amount of unemployment
assistance. The rest of the insurance benefits are funded by mandatory contributions from
both the employers and the employees and by the membership fees. An increase in
unemployment leads to increases in the contributions from employers and employees. As the
unions and the UI-funds cover roughly the same sectors, this creates a system of experience-
rating in the unemployment insurance contributions that should lead to lower wage increases
and higher employment (Holmlund and Lundborg, 1988).
8 
4.4.3 Wage bargaining 
The wage bargains  - containing an agreement on the general wage increase applied to all
wages – are negotiated at the industry-level between the worker and the employer
organizations. Collective agreements cover also non-union members in the sectors where at
least half of the employers belong to an employer organization. In practice, this implies that
95 percent of the workers in Finland are covered by the union contracts (Holm 2000).
Most bargaining rounds have started with negotiations between confederations of employer
and employee unions, creating a high degree of co-ordination in the individual union
contracts. The union bargains have then been negotiated based on the wage increases agreed
in the central agreement. The first central agreement was negotiated between the government
and the employer and employee organizations in 1968. There has been considerable variation
in the degree of centralization between the different bargaining rounds. During the period
1969 – 2002, there have been seven bargaining rounds (1973, -80, -83, -88, -94, -95, and
                                                
7 Using data from 13 European countries over the period 1960-2000 Checchi and Lucifora (2002) also find that
Gent-system increases the union density.
8 The 1999 reform effectively increases the degree of experience-rating because an increase in wages is not
matched by an increase in the government subsidy to the UI-funds (Sinko, 2001).29
2000) when no central bargain was reached and bargaining occurred at the industry-level.
Even in the absence of a central bargain has been reached, not all unions accepted the bargain.  
Co-ordination in the union bargaining may moderate wage increases by internalising the cost
of unemployment due to extensive wage increases. Calmfors (2001) summarizes the results of
recent studies. These studies find that unemployment is lowest in the countries where
bargaining is most centralized. Given the variation in the degree of centralization between the
different bargaining rounds, we can extend the previous analyses by examining the effects of
the year-to-year differences in bargaining regimes within a country. With our data it is more
natural to examine the effects of centralization on wage growth than on unemployment, and
we report these results below.
As shown in the table 4.1, the average bargained wage increases have been 1.8 percentage
points lower during the centralized bargaining rounds. If one looks at the differences between
centralized bargains with wide coverage (almost all unions accepting the central agreement)
and decentralized bargains the difference is even greater, 3%. Controlling for the differences
in unemployment and inflation at the time of wage negotiations does not alter the picture. The
difference between central bargains and industry-level bargains is 3.3% and the difference
between centralized bargains with wide coverage and decentralized bargains is 4.1%. 
Wage drift, i.e. average wage growth that exceeds the bargained wage increases, may offset
the wage moderating effects of centralized bargaining. According to figures in the rightmost
column of table 4.1, this has not been the case in Finland. Nominal wage increases have
exceeded the bargained wage increases by 4%, on average, but the differences in nominal
wage increases between the centralized and the industry-level bargains are approximately as
large as the differences in the bargained wage increases.
To conclude, the results using Finnish data lie in conformity with findings from cross-country
data according to which the centralized bargaining will moderate wage formation and,
thereby, will decrease the equilibrium unemployment. Prime examples from the 1990’s
include national bargains in the recession years 1992 and 1993 when the wages were not
increased at all. On the other hand, different rates of economic recoveries across industries
lead to industry-level bargaining and somewhat higher wage increases in 1994 and 1995.    30
Table 4.1 Nominal wage increases by the level of wage bargaining
Raw averages Number of
cases
Bargained
wage increase
Nominal wage
growth
Decentralized bargaining 7 6.5 10.1
Centralized bargaining  (all) 27 4.7 8.9
Degree of  centralization
     No coverage (decentralized) 7 6.5 10.1
     Low coverage       3 8.4 13.3
     Medium coverage 10 6.6 12.0
     Wide coverage 14 2.5 5.1
Controlling for unemployment and
inflation
Number of
cases
Bargained
wage increase
Nominal wage
growth
Decentralized bargaining 7 7.7 12.2
Centralized bargaining  (all) 27 4.4 8.1
Degree of  centralization
     No coverage (decentralized) 7 7.3 11.8
     Low coverage       3 7.1 10.6
     Medium coverage 10 5.5 9.5
     Wide coverage 14 3.2 6.7
The numbers in the lower section of the table are based on a regression model of bargained wage increase (and
nominal wage growth) on lagged unemployment and inflation rates and dummies for the different bargaining
regimes. Estimation period is 1969-2002 for the bargained wage increases and 1969-2000 for the nominal wage
growth. Data on the degree of centralization, the bargained wage increases and the nominal wage growth are
from Marjanen (2002). Unemployment and inflation rates are from Labour Force Survey and Consumer Price
Index of Statistics Finland. In all estimated equations unemployment had a significant negative effect, and
inflation an insignificant positive effect, on both the bargained and the actual wage increases. The dummy
variables for different bargaining regimes were highly significant in all estimated equations. Adding a time trend
to the equations had only a small effect on the estimated differences across bargaining regimes but lowered the
coefficient on unemployment rate so that it was no more significant at the 5 % level.
4.5 Active labour market policies
Government spending on the active labour market programmes (ALMP) has been on the rise
in most OECD countries over the past two decades. Measured as a fraction of GDP, the
expenditure on ALMP has been higher in Finland than in the EU- countries, on average.
While expenditures on ALMP have increased in the 1990’s, the rise in ALMP has not been
proportional to the increase in unemployment. 
Figure 4.5 shows how the size of the active labour market programs has evolved during the
past twenty years. In the 1980’s the vast majority of programs were placements to subsidized
jobs in the public sector. In the 1990’s, the share of labour market training has increased. The31
total number of individuals in the different programs was highest in 1997 when more than
100 000 persons and more than 4% of the labour force were placed in active labour market
programs. Simply adding the individuals in programs to open unemployment would increase
the unemployment rate by 4%, but the calculation is not quite as simple because that some of
these individuals are already classified as unemployed in the Labour Force Surveys. 
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Figure 4.5: The share of the labour force in active labour market programs
Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
Most empirical Finnish studies on the effects of ALMPs have concentrated in estimating the
employment effects of different programs using micro-level data. The results indicate that
participation in training programs have, in general, improved labour market prospects.
Hämäläinen (1999) finds that training programs have been beneficial for 80-90 percent of the
participants and Tuomala (2002) reports that labour market training has increased post-
program employment probability and shortened the duration of unemployment. The results on
the subsidized job programs are less encouraging. Tuomala (2002) finds that program
participation has even reduced the probability of finding a job from open labour markets. Also
Hämäläinen reports that subsidized jobs have been less effective than other labour market32
programs, but notes that placements to the private sector improve labour market opportunities
more than placements to the public sector.
9
There are not many studies on the macroeconomic effects of the ALMPs. According to
Eriksson, Suvanto and Vartia (1990) ALMPs have not had any effect on wages, but their data
do not cover an interesting period of 1990s. Pehkonen (1997) studies youth labour market
programs and argues that ALMP may have substantial displacement effects but fails to find
robust estimates of the likely size of the displacement effects. 
4.6 Labour taxes and unemployment
In Finland labour taxes are among the highest in the OECD countries. In 2000, the tax rate for
a single wage earner with average income exceeded the Finnish tax rate only in Italy,
Belgium, Denmark and Germany. Since the Finnish tax system has no deductions for
dependent children the relative tax rate for families with children is even higher. 
Figure 4.6 describes the development of the tax wedge for the average production worker in
Finland between 1987 and 2002. During the period 1991-1995 the tax wedge increased from
52.1. % to 60.2 % and has then decreased to 56.6% in 2002. The largest changes have
occurred in the income taxes and in the compulsory employee contributions to the
unemployment insurance and pension systems. The changes in the consumption taxes and the
employer contributions (main part of which consists of pension contributions) have been
rather modest. A single factor that caused a jump in the tax rates in 1994, was removing tax
deductions for dependent children. Also the reductions in the tax wedge after 1995 had to do
with income taxes. Following the reforms starting in 1996, an earned income tax deduction
was introduced to municipal taxes. Earned income tax deduction was then substantially
increased in 1997 and 1999. Also the marginal tax rates in the higher tax brackets have been
lowered.  
                                                
9  International evidence seems roughly similar. Programmes with a training content seem most likely to improve
employment probability, while subsidy schemes have shown dismal performance. See e.g. Kluve and Schmidt
(2002).33
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Figure 4.6 Tax wedge for the average production worker 1990-2002 
Source: Taxpayers Association of Finland
It is not easy to assess the effect of the changes in taxation on unemployment. The main
problem is that tax burden is not exogenous. In the early 1990s the tax rates were increased to
cover the government budget deficit, largely due to the increase in the costs of
unemployment. Improving government finances in the later part of 1990’s have made modest
tax deductions possible. At the same time the unemployment rate has decreased.
Theoretically, of course, an increase in either payroll, income or consumption taxes may lead
to an increase in the labour costs and, therefore, reduced employment. Most recent Finnish
estimates suggest that roughly half of the changes in the income taxes are shifted to higher
labour costs. The incidence of the payroll taxes would seem to fall slightly more to the
employers leading to higher changes in the labour costs. (Honkapohja, Koskela and Uusitalo
(1999)). Earlier studies that also use aggregate or industry data have obtained rather similar
results (Holm, Honkapohja and Koskela (1994), Pehkonen (1999), Kiander and Pehkonen
(1999)).    34
Honkapohja et. al (1999) use industry-level time series and find that the long-run elasticity of
employment with respect to labour costs is, on average, -0.7. The estimates from panel data
consisting of 500 largest Finnish companies observed over the period from 1986 to 1997 are
smaller and vary depending on the exact specification. These estimates suggest that decreases
in taxation after 1995 have contributed to the increase in employment but the effects are not
very large. 
Finland has naturally been included in several cross-country studies that have evaluated the
effects of labour taxes on unemployment. The results of such comparisons usually indicate
that higher taxes lead to higher unemployment, even though the conclusions tend to be rather
cautious. For example,  Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude: “…the balance of evidence
suggests that there is probably some adverse tax effect on unemployment and labour input. Its
precise scale, however, remains elusive”. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) summarize their
findings as follows: “We obtain evidence of a highly significant and very large effect of
labour taxes on the unemployment rate in continental Europe…the estimated coefficient of
labour taxes ranges from about 0.3 to over 0.5 depending on the specification”. Their
estimates from Nordic countries, are of the same sign, but not statistically significant. This
might suggest that taxation will have weaker effect on wage formation and thereby on
unemployment in corporatist economies than in economies where the degree of centralization
of wage bargaining is lower. 
5. On the duration of unemployment
For most of the 1980s, long-term unemployment was not much of the problem in Finland.
Average duration of ongoing unemployment spells was around 25 weeks, and the proportion
of the long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than a year) slightly over 10 percent.
This was partly due to favourable employment situation and partly to legislation enacted in
1987 (abolished in 1992) that required employment offices to place long-term unemployed to
subsidised jobs in the municipal sector.
During the recession in the early 1990s this favourable picture changed completely. First,
followed by a large increase in the inflow to unemployment, the average duration declined
and the fraction of the long-term unemployed fell to 3 percent. Then the fraction of the long-
term unemployed grew together with the unemployment rate until 1995. By then almost a
third of the unemployed were classified as long-term unemployed. Long-term unemployment35
remained high also after 1995 even though the unemployment rate was declining. The average
duration of the ongoing unemployment spells has been approximately 52 weeks since 1995.   
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Figure 5.1: Proportion of long-term unemployed 1981-2001
Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
Long-term unemployment displays anti-clockwise loops and lags behind the unemployment
rate. As shown by Machin and Manning (1999), a similar picture appears also in a number of
other European countries. Variation in the inflow rates is partly responsible for the observed
loops. It is also possible that the outflow rates for the long-term unemployed falls more in the
recession, as the employers have a larger pool of unemployed to choose from. In the ranking
model by Blanchard and Diamond (1994), employers always choose to hire the workers with
the shortest unemployment duration. The ranking model therefore implies that the duration
dependence increases during the recession. 
To look at the issues more closely, we performed some empirical calculations using
administrative data from the unemployment offices. We use the same sample of as in the
previous chapter containing all recorded unemployment spells experienced by 350 000
individuals, drawn randomly from the Employment Statistics. We collect information on the
dates of entry into unemployment and exit out of unemployment for the period 1987 – 1999.36
After deleting some individuals with missing dates we were left with 664 000 unemployment
spells. Given the long panel, we can examine the changes in the re-employment hazard and
duration dependence over the whole business cycle. 
First, in table 5.1, we calculate the exit rates from unemployment to the active labour market
programs, open employment, and out of the labour force. We find that only less than half of
the unemployment spells end by an exit to open employment. The fraction of exits to open
employment varies across the cycle, and account for only a quarter of exits during the worst
years of recession. Opposite cyclical movements can be observed in the exits to the active
labour programs and out of the labour force. A high fraction of the unknown destinations,
particularly in the early 1990s may have an effect on these estimates.
Table 5.1 Reason of ending unemployment 
       |                          Reason %
       |
 Year  |       ALP   Employed  Out of LF     Recall    Unknown |     Total
-------+-------------------------------------------------------+----------
    87 |      5.32      60.58       9.55       1.93      22.62 |    28 383 
    88 |      4.54      57.42       8.04       8.28      21.73 |    29 838 
    89 |      4.44      57.43       8.44       8.12      21.56 |    28 194 
    90 |      8.80      41.76       9.04       7.72      32.69 |    31 192 
    91 |     15.05      24.89      12.97       3.09      44.01 |    57 309 
    92 |     18.57      24.25      16.12       4.32      36.74 |    66 016 
    93 |     24.35      23.47      15.96       9.12      27.11 |    67 613 
    94 |     27.12      37.73      16.31       5.33      13.51 |    64 585 
    95 |     28.63      38.55      15.50       4.69      12.63 |    64 395 
    96 |     28.69      39.27      13.81       4.46      13.77 |    66 027 
    97 |     27.88      40.38      12.71       4.51      14.52 |    57 162 
    98 |     25.97      42.48      11.14       4.77      15.64 |    53 554 
    99 |     21.26      45.66      10.26       6.49      16.33 |    49 094 
-------+-------------------------------------------------------+----------
 Total |     21.13      37.77      13.23       5.44      22.43 |   664 082 
Below, we focus on the exits to the open employment (including recalls from a lay-off) and
treat all other exits as censored observations. The restriction is partly motivated by several
changes in the active labour market policies that may weaken the comparability across the
years. In table 5.2 we report results from fitting a simple parametric Weibull-model to the
duration data. In the first column we include no covariates except the year dummies (entry
year). The results are reported as hazard ratios restricting the year 1990 to one.37
 Table 5.2 Duration model for employment hazards
(1) (2) (3)
Year (base 1990)
           1987 1.160 1.143 0.952
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.017)**
           1988 1.434 1.424 1.313
(0.016)** (0.016)** (0.023)**
           1989 1.570 1.587 1.523
(0.018)** (0.018)** (0.027)**
           1991 0.426 0.415 0.291
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
           1992 0.343 0.331 0.214
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**
           1993 0.389 0.374 0.239
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
           1994 0.556 0.531 0.402
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)**
           1995 0.594 0.567 0.438
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)**
           1996 0.639 0.616 0.484
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.009)**
           1997 0.693 0.674 0.546
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.009)**
           1998 0.746 0.697 0.554
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)**
           1999 0.915 0.850 0.668
(0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)**
Age (base 35-44)
           15-24 1.113 1.017
(0.006)** (0.008)*
           25-34 1.070 1.038
(0.006)** (0.008)**
           45-54 0.913 0.932
(0.006)** (0.009)**
           55-64 0.417 0.344
(0.005)** (0.005)**
Education (base primary)
           Secondary 1.150 1.219
(0.010)** (0.015)**
           Vocational 1.413 1.641
(0.007)** (0.011)**
           Higher 1.544 1.800
(0.009)** (0.017)**
           University 1.733 1.949
(0.021)** (0.036)**
Female 1.028 1.077
(0.004)** (0.006)**
Disabled 0.487 0.370
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Local unemployment rate 0.999 0.999
(0.000)** (0.001)*
Observations 664082 663692 663692
P 0.67 0.70 0.94
Frailty 1.61
Reported coefficients are hazard ratios. Standard errors in parentheses
 * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level38
The estimation results show that hazard rates are clearly counter-cyclical. During the boom in
the late 1980s the employment hazards were about 50 percent higher than in 1990. In contrast,
during the recession, 1992 – 1993, the hazard was only third of the 1990 level. Towards the
end of the 1990s, the hazard rates have been increasing, but are still below the pre-recession
level. The duration dependence is documented by the Weibull-coefficient “p” at the bottom of
the table. For the exponential model with constant hazard the p is equal to one. Value 0.67
shows strong negative duration dependence. Probability of exit decreases rapidly with the
spell duration.
Baker (1992) examined whether the changes in the hazard rates over the cycle could be
explained by the compositional effects. The composition of the inflow to unemployment may
change over the cycle. If groups that typically can expect relatively longer durations enter
unemployment in proportionally greater numbers during the recession, the aggregate average
duration will display countercyclical variation. However, the results in Baker (1992) indicated
that the composition of the inflow do not explain the variation in the duration. 
We examine the composition effects in column 2 of table 5.2. We add covariates measuring
age, education and sex to the duration model. To capture the regional differences, we include
a measure of the regional unemployment rate. We also add an indicator on whether an
unemployed has been classified mentally or physically disabled by the employment offices.
These additional covariates have a large impact on the hazard rates. As expected, the hazard
rates increase with education and decrease with age. Females have a slightly higher hazard,
and a higher regional unemployment lowers the hazard rates. Having been classified as
disabled almost halves the re-employment hazard. However, adding all these covariates has
little effect on the time pattern of the hazard rates. Hence, according to estimation results, the
changes in the hazard rates over the cycle are not driven by the composition of the
unemployed.
In the third column, we generalize the model to allow for unobserved heterogeneity. We make
a standard assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity is multiplicative, and follows a
Gamma distribution. The main impact of allowing for the unobserved heterogeneity is that
our estimate of duration dependence declines. 
We also estimated the model allowing the duration dependence differ across the years. (not
reported in the table). The results were quite interesting. Negative duration dependence was39
strongest in the years 1992-94, when the expected durations (and the unemployment rates)
were at their highest level. The results are consistent with the ranking model by Blanchard
and Diamond (1994).
6. Conclusions
What are the lessons that could be drawn based on the Finnish unemployment experience
during the past twenty years? First one might observe that, in 2002, the Finnish
unemployment rates are rather close to the European average both in terms of the level and
the duration. An interesting question is why the unemployment rate remained so low until the
late 1980s. An obvious candidate for the explanation is that the Finnish economy experienced
much smaller shocks than the countries in the continental Europe. 
During the 1980s, the Finnish economy was relatively isolated from the rest of the Europe. In
the absence of free international capital movements the central bank could set the interest
rates freely, and the devaluations of the Finnish markka could be used to adjust the price level
to maintain the competitiveness of the export sector. Bilateral trade with the former Soviet
Union contributed to the stability. According to the bilateral trade agreements, an increase in
oil prices led automatically to an increase in the export demand. Therefore, trade with the
Soviet Union effectively isolated Finland from the oil price shocks that are often at least
partly blamed for the increased unemployment in Europe. The liberalization of the financial
markets in the end of the 1980s and the end of the bilateral trade agreements opened the
Finnish economy to the outside shocks. The incomplete design of financial market
deregulation associated with the fixed exchange rate target of the Finnish markka led to large
indebtedness of the private sector. High real interest rates were the huge adverse shocks to the
highly indebted private sector.
While the economic shocks provide a sufficient explanation to the rapid increase in the
unemployment in the early 1990’s, it is difficult to argue that these shocks explain the
persistency of unemployment during the strong recovery period in the later part of 1990’s.
If not the shocks, maybe the institutions should bare the blame. However, the labour market
institutions today are not much different than in the 1980s. The main features of the
unemployment insurance system are unchanged. The union density has increased but the
union coverage has remained roughly constant. Main features of  the wage bargaining system40
are also unchanged. The changes in the tax system and in the active labour market policies
should probably be seen as the consequences and not as the causes for the development. Also
empirically their effects on employment appear to have been relatively small. These
institutions did not create high unemployment rates in the 1980s. Nickell (1999) calculates the
change in the equilibrium unemployment rate from 1980s to 1990s in Finland based on the
coefficients from cross-country regressions of unemployment on institutional features. He
concludes that the changes in the institutions only explain the rise in equilibrium
unemployment from 5.7 to 6.1 percent.  
However, no major shocks hit the economy until the early 1990s. Maybe the institutional
rigidities started to matter only after a major shock. Interactions between shocks and
institutions a’la Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) might provide a better explanation for
persistent unemployment. The easiest example is the unemployment tunnel, guaranteeing
elderly unemployed benefits until retirement. The policy was introduced when the
unemployment rates were low, and long-term unemployment rare. The extended benefits did
not appear to have much effect then. Only when the recession created a need to cut the
workforce, the benefits for the older started to matter, increasing the incidence and duration of
unemployment. 
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